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The Confluence of International Trade and 
Investment: Exploring the Nexus between Export 
Controls and Indirect Expropriation
Umair Ghori*
Abstract
Export controls have received little attention in international trade law. Considering 
recent decisions in trade disputes involving Chinese control of exports, the area has 
received renewed interest. This article explores the effect of export controls and their 
connection with indirect expropriation, especially where export controls are imposed 
by host states to alleviate shortages. Such controls may prevent a foreign investor from 
earning revenue through resource exports. The article posits that, in certain situations, 
export controls can be deemed expropriatory and, therefore, in the settlement of in-
vestment disputes between host states and foreign investor, the interpretation of Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“gatt”)/World Trade Organization (“wto”) juris-
prudence on the area may play a useful role because of the ad hoc nature of 
investor-state dispute settlement (“isds”) arbitration and due to the lack of precedent 
in international investment law. However, this role can at best be an initial point, and 
that space must be reserved for international investment jurisprudence to develop 
more organically.
1 Introduction
This article explores the overlap between international trade and investment 
laws in an area which has begun to receive increased attention. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“gatt”)1/World Trade Organization (“wto”) 
204206
* llb (Hons), llm, PhD. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Robina qld 4229 
Australia. E-mail: ughori@bond.edu.au. The author wishes to thank Emeritus Professor Mary 
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1 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed 30 October 1947, 55 unts 194 (entered 
into force 1 January 1948); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
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framework is mainly oriented towards controlling the import behaviour of 
wto Members. This is in line with the prevailing wisdom during various 
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, where the overarching objective was 
to cut import tariffs in order to foster increased trade amongst nations.
Export controls received little attention during the phased construction 
of the wto system. It was thought that since countries would be eager to ex-
port their outputs for monetary gain, export controls would be limited to cir-
cumstances such as national emergencies, natural disasters, famine or times 
of war. The inadequacies of the gatt/wto system regarding export controls 
recently emerged following China’s imposition of export restrictions on rare 
earths and certain raw materials.2 However, in the not too distant past, United 
States (“US”) and European textiles interest groups approached their govern-
ments to counter India’s export controls on cotton because the restrictions 
were affecting their members’ business.3 Similarly, Pakistan took extensive 
efforts to prevent export of cotton yarn in 2009–10 after the local apparel in-
dustries complained about a lack of availability of cotton yarn domestically.4 
In 2018, the then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull threatened to 
impose export quotas in order to convince gas companies to divert part of 
their output for domestic reserves.5 The measures by the Australian govern-
ment were meant to reduce domestic gas prices, in light of a possible phase 
 opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 unts 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1A 
(“General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994”).
2 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten 
and Molybdenum, wto Doc WT/DS431/AB/R; WT/DS432/AB/R; WT/DS433/AB/R (7 Au-
gust 2014); Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, wto Doc WT/DS394/AB/R (30 January 2012).
3 “Global & Indian Textile Industry Locks Horn Over Cotton Exports”, The Economic Times (on-
line, 27 October 2010) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/cons-products/ 
garments-/-textiles/global-indian-textile-industry-locks-horn-over-cotton-exports/article 
show/6821998.cms>.
4 Ahmed Abdullah, “Pakistan: Export Yarn Duty Removed”, just-style (Web Page, 27 July 2010) 
<http://www.just-style.com/news/export-yarn-duty-removed_id108416.aspx?1k=dm>.
5 Fleur Anderson, “Malcolm Turnbull Slaps Export Controls on Recalcitrant Gas Exporters”, 
Australian Financial Review (Web Page, 26 April 2017) <https://www.afr.com/politics/ 
malcolm-turnbull-slaps-export-controls-on-recalcitrant-gas-exporters-20170426-gvsuh4>; 
Louise Yaxley, “Malcolm Turnbull Says Government Will Restrict Gas Exports in Attempt to 
Lower Power Prices”, abc News (Web Page, 20 June 2017) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-
06-20/government-will-intervene-to-restrict-gas-export:-turnbull/8634674>; see also Henry 
Belot, “Gas Export Controls on Hold as Government Strikes Deal with Suppliers”, abc News 
(Web Page, 27 September 2017) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-27/gas-export-con 
trols-on-hold-amid-government-agreement/8993254>.
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out of coal-fired power plants and their substitution with gas-fired power 
stations.6
These measures indicate changing times. Governments appear inclined to 
use export controls to alleviate local shortages and to achieve domestic policy 
objectives. The scenario envisaged in this article is based on the large, multina-
tional resource companies that invest in a country to mine, process and export 
products such as liquefied natural gas (“lng”), liquefied petroleum gas (“lpg”), 
fuels and oils. If the government of the host state restricts the ability of the 
companies to export their output, that may undercut the profit margins of the 
investor, thereby indirectly expropriating the investment by the foreign inves-
tor. Of course, the question of whether indirect expropriation has occurred or 
not depends on the underlying free trade agreement (“fta”) or bilateral invest-
ment treaty (“bit”) which may have led to the initial investment. With this 
conceptual background, the article explores the larger theme of export con-
trols and their expropriatory effects. The debate cannot be limited to natural 
resources and commodities only. As the global population grows, trade in agri-
cultural products, food and livestock can be potentially affected by the appli-
cation of export controls as well. Furthermore, policymakers in resource- 
exporting countries may be tempted to enact export controls in the form of 
higher tariffs when the economies graduate to higher value-added sectors. The 
aim behind such controls is to inwardly divert resources towards nascent 
 value-added sectors in order to enhance their productivity and competitive-
ness in the international market. When industrial transition towards higher 
value-added sectors occurs, economies previously reliant on exports of prima-
ry production shift their economic policies towards exporting finished goods 
instead. At this stage, control of exports may assume greater importance and 
the economic interests of the host countries may conflict with those of exist-
ing foreign investors.
This article proceeds as follows: Part 2 of this article briefly covers the use of 
export controls. Part 3 summarises the wto rules and jurisprudence on export 
controls, along with gatt art xx(j), which refers to the powers of the wto mem-
ber to adopt measures in order to secure or distribute products that are in short 
supply nationally or locally. Even though the discussion of gatt art xx(j) is in 
the context of the India – Solar Cells7 case (a dispute  concerning  government 
subsidies), the treatment of art xx(j) by the Appellate Body provides us with 
6 Ian Verrender, “Gas, Not Coal, the Key to Fixing Australia’s Electricity Mess”, abc News (Web 
Page, 11 September 2017) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-09-11/gas-not-coal-the-fix-to- 
australias-soaring-electricity-prices/8890818>.
7 Appellate Body Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, 
wto Doc WT/DS456/AB/R (16 September 2016) (“India – Solar Cells, Appellate Body 
Report”).
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useful insights of how the wto treats the question of local or general short 
supply, which may be one of the possible rationales for the imposition of ex-
port controls. Part 4 explores the possible connection between investment and 
export controls. In addition to briefly discussing various doctrines explaining 
indirect expropriation, this part constructs simulated scenarios to illustrate the 
premise that when foreign investors particularly invest in a country with a view 
to exporting the output of their operations, any governmental measures inter-
fering with exports become expropriatory in nature. The aim behind simulated 
scenarios is to illustrate the use of export controls vis-à-vis foreign investments 
in the absence of no known disputes and/or cases on the area.
Taken on a basic plane, foreign investment based on the export-driven mod-
el presumes that the function of the investment is to generate profits through 
the process of export. Any restriction by the host state that undercuts the prof-
itability of the venturers may amount to indirect expropriation. Part 5 of the 
article offers an analysis based on the question of what role gatt/wto juris-
prudence will play in the adjudication of future investment disputes arising 
based on export controls. To answer this question, Part 5 explores two paths, 
the first path involving parallel actions in the realm of international trade and 
international investment law, and the second path involving consideration of 
importing interpretative norms and standards from the gatt/wto jurispru-
dence in settlement of any future investment disputes on export controls. Part 
6 concludes.
Overall, this article surmises that any future investment disputes involving 
export controls will borrow heavily from gatt/wto jurisprudence in the settle-
ment of disputes and wto Dispute Settlement Body (“dsb”) decisions such as 
India – Solar Cells may play an important interpretative role if export controls 
have been imposed to alleviate a local or general short supply of materials.
2 When Do States Impose Export Controls?
Countries may use export controls to alleviate shortages of essential food and 
raw materials during testing times. In the past, the food price increased inter-
nationally whenever major supplier countries restricted its export to meet do-
mestic demand. For example, the US imposed export controls on grains and 
fodder in 1973 to maintain domestic prices for animal feed. The flow-on effects 
of export controls were felt in Japan, which was dependent on such imports 
from the US.8
8 Mitsuo Matsushita, “Export Controls of Natural Resources and the wto/gatt Disciplines” 
(2011) 6(2) Asian Journal of wto & International Health Law & Policy 281, 284.
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Export controls are also used to prevent proliferation of weapons and mili-
tary technology.9 Importers and exporters must be aware of any internation-
al sanctions, controls and monitoring mechanisms. Another example can be 
the export control of nuclear materials, which makes the export of nuclear 
weapons-related materials difficult.10 The idea behind such control is not out-
right banning or prevention, but, rather, to increase the opportunity cost be-
hind the transaction.
Another application of export control is prevention of trade in resources 
that result from exploitation such as slavery or that come from conflict zones.11 
Such controls make commerce and transactions difficult so that costs become 
prohibitively high. Export controls may also used in order to conserve archaeo-
logical and/or cultural artefacts or the environment, or in relation to trade af-
fecting endangered species.12 These are all specialised applications of export 
controls. The focus of this article, however, is on the economic aspect of export 
controls as manifested in international trade and investment law. In interna-
tional trade, export controls may appear as quotas or increased export taxes. 
Export controls can also be achieved indirectly through reduced production of 
materials, which automatically leaves little for export. If there is little or no do-
mestic consumption of the material in question, then there is effectively no ex-
port control. Price maintenance and affecting the availability and  management 
of resources can also be potential uses of export controls. Governments often 
9 See, eg, “Materiel Export Control”, Department of Defence (Web Page) <http://www 
.defence.gov.au/CASG/DoingBusiness/Internationalengagementandexportsupport/ 
Materiel%20export%20control.asp>; see also “Strategic Export Control in 2016: Military 
Equipment and Dual-Use Items”, Government Offices of Sweden (Web Page, 3 November 
2017) <http://www.government.se/legal-documents/2017/11/strategic-export-control-in- 
2016/>.
10 Lynn E Davis, “Arms Control, Export Regimes and Multilateral Cooperation” in Zalmay 
Khalilzad, John White and Andy Marshall (eds), Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of 
Information in Warfare (rand Corporation, 1999) 361, 364–365; see generally Ian Anthony, 
Christer Ahlström and Vitaly Fedchenko, Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (sipri Research Report No 22, 2007).
11 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, “Regulatory Transparency in 
Multilateral Agreements Controlling Exports of Tropical Timber, E-Waste and Conflict 
Diamonds” (Trade Policy Paper No 141, 10 December 2012).
12 See e.g. Nordic Council of Ministers, Illicit Trade in Cultural Artefacts: Stronger Together – 
How can the Nordics Join Forces to Stop the Illegal Import and Export of Cultural Objects 
(Report, 2017) 49–51; see also Neil Brodie and Isber Sabrine, “The Illegal Excavation and 
Trade of Syrian Cultural Objects: A View From the Ground” (2017) 53(1) Journal of Field 
Archaeology 74, 82; Rosalind Reeve, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the 
cites Treaty and Compliance (Earthscan, 2002) 549.
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resort to restrictions on exports to ensure availability of materials and goods 
at a certain price level. Another aspect of price maintenance is when states or 
groups of states that have common interests in trading in a commodity impose 
export controls to regulate prices (for example, countries in the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (“opec”) frequently meet to discuss pro-
duction and exports of petroleum to maintain pricing levels).
3 The gatt/wto Framework and the Use of Export Controls
3.1 Overview
Export controls were largely ignored during negotiations for the gatt 1947 (the 
predecessor of gatt 1994) because of the singular attention given to the reduc-
tion of trade barriers and the cutting of high import tariffs13Export controls 
appear within gatt 1994 rather esoterically as a “prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions” (gatt art xi). Therefore, the gatt/wto framework treats export 
quotas similarly to import quotas in that it prohibits quotas in its application 
to both imports and exports. However, the specified prohibition on quotas un-
der art xi is qualified by several exceptions. gatt art xi(2)(a) allows wto 
members to restrict exports temporarily in order “to relieve critical shortages 
of foodstuffs” or other “essential” products, while gatt art xi(2)(b) allows the 
wto Members to apply technical standards for the classification, grading or 
marketing of commodities in international trade.
Export controls are further affected by gatt art xx, which enables wto 
members to adopt exceptional measures. gatt art xx exceptions are further 
qualified by an additional requirement appearing in the chapeau to the said 
provision. The chapeau states that any measures adopted by wto members in 
line with the general exceptions shall not be arbitrary or discriminatory “be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail”. The chapeau clearly states 
that the exceptions provided under art xx must not be employed as a “dis-
guised” form of restrictions on international trade.
Export controls are also permissible under gatt art xxi(b)(iii), which ena-
bles wto Members to maintain trade restrictions in times of war or national 
emergencies. Some commentators allude to the ineffectiveness of the gatt art 
13 Mitsuo Matsushita, “Export Control of Natural Resources: wto Panel Ruling on the Chi-
nese Export Restrictions of Natural Resources” (2011) 3(2) Trade, Law & Development 268, 
270; Bin Gu, “Mineral Export Restraints and Sustainable Development: Are Rare Earths 
Testing the wto’s Loopholes?” (2011) 4(4) Journal of International Economic Law 765, 784.
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xi prohibition on export quotas by pointing out the high number of accompa-
nying exceptions.14
Export tariffs can constitute an additional element of export controls. How-
ever, export tariffs are different from import tariffs because of gatt art ii(1)(b), 
which imposes a limitation on the tariff levels which wto members may place 
on imports above the concession rates. By comparison, export tariffs do not 
usually have such restrictions. Hence, wto members can impose tariff-based 
export restraints.15 Export tariffs as export controls are not prohibited per se 
under wto law unless the tariffs are prohibitively high.16 Effectively, this 
means that export tariffs can be used for actual export control or revenue gen-
eration by countries. However, if export duties reach a prohibitive level, then 
this essentially translates into zero-export quotas which falls within the cover-
age of gatt art xi’s prohibition on quotas.17
gatt art xx is another provision that affects export controls. This provi-
sion allows wto members to derogate from their obligations. In availing the 
exceptions, the foremost issue for the party invoking exceptions under gatt 
art xx is to satisfy the standard of proof. Cases such as EC – Tariff Preferences 
and US – Shrimp demonstrate that the standard of proof rests on the invoking 
party (the wto member adopting export controls).18 The country maintaining 
controls must demonstrate upon challenge that the justification for imposing 
the measure meets the exceptions outlined in gatt art xx. Additionally, the 
requirement of the chapeau must also be satisfied. The order of the burden 
of proof was clarified by the wto Appellate Body in the US – Shrimp case. 
Firstly, the country maintaining the impugned measures must demonstrate 
that the measures fall within one of the gatt art xx exceptions. Secondly, 
14 John H Jackson et al, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (West Publishing, 
3rd ed, 1995) 946, cited in Matsushita, “Export Control of Natural Resources: wto Panel 
Ruling on the Chinese Export Restrictions of Natural Resources” (n 13) 272 and Matsushi-
ta, “Export Controls of Natural Resources and the wto/gatt Disciplines” (n 8) 288.
15 Matsushita, “Export Control of Natural Resources: wto Panel Ruling on the Chinese Ex-
port Restrictions of Natural Resources” (n 13) 273.
16 Ibid; see also Julia Ya Qin, “Reforming wto Discipline on Export Duties: Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources, Economic Development and Environmental Protection” (2012) 46(5) 
Journal of World Trade 1147, 1153.
17 Matsushita, “Export Control of Natural Resources: wto Panel Ruling on the Chinese Ex-
port Restrictions of Natural Resources” (n 13) 273; Ya Qin (n 16) 1153.
18 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Pref-
erences to Developing Countries, wto Doc WT/DS246/AB/R (7 April 2004) [95] (“EC – 
Tariff Preferences, Appellate Body Report”); Appellate Body Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Shrimp and Certain Shrimp Products, wto Doc WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 
1998) [158] (“US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report”).
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the requirement of the chapeau must be fulfilled. Therefore, the order of ap-
plication is to satisfy one of the exceptions under gatt art xx and then the 
chapeau.19
gatt art xx exceptions (b) and (g) have been the subject of the most usage 
and disputes in the wto. Exceptions (b) and (g) are not the subject of discus-
sion in this article, because where a country is attempting to alleviate shortfall 
of materials or resources, exception (j) becomes relevant, especially where ex-
port controls are concerned.
Exception (j) is the emerging category that has seen use only once as a de-
fence in wto dispute settlement proceedings. This occurred in the India – 
 Solar Cells case, where India cited exception (j) along with exception (d) in 
defence of its solar panel subsidy measures which were challenged by the 
US.20
3.2 The India – Solar Cells case and Exception ( j)
The case did not actually broach the question of export controls. Rather, it 
concerned government subsidies for solar industries. The case becomes rele-
vant here for two reasons. Firstly, it is the only case in wto jurisprudence 
where the question of securing or distributing products in short supply is dis-
cussed. Secondly, gatt art xx(j) may form the basis of exceptional arguments 
that wto members can adopt when imposing export controls to secure or dis-
tribute products in short supply.
The Appellate Body, in determining the question of “short supply”, stated 
that due regard must be given to the total quantity of imports that may be 
available to meet the necessary supply in a particular geographical area or 
market.21 This may mean assessing whether international supply of the prod-
uct is stable, which in turn considers “distance between a particular geographi-
cal area or market and productions sites” and “the reliability of local or trans-
national supply chains”.22
19 US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report (n 18) [118]–[121].
20 Panel Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, wto Doc 
WT/DS456/R (24 February 2016) [7.3.1]–[7.3.2] (“India – Solar Cells, Panel Report”).
21 The Appellate Body held that art xx(j) reflects a balance of different considerations that 
must be considered in assessing the question of “general or local short supply”. Such con-
siderations include the level of domestic production of the product in question, the na-
ture of products in “general or local short supply”, geographical market, price fluctuations, 
the purchasing power of domestic and foreign consumers and the role played by domes-
tic and foreign producers in the market including “the extent to which domestic produc-
ers sell their production abroad”: India – Solar Cells, Appellate Body Report (n 7) [6.4].
22 Ibid.
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The Appellate Body further clarified that whatever factors are relevant de-
pends on the peculiarities of each case.23 Regardless of the factors that may be 
applicable, the party adopting the measure must demonstrate that “available” 
supply, from both domestic and international sources, is insufficient to meet 
demand.24
Note that the criteria from India – Solar Cells must be balanced with gatt 
art xi 2(a)–(b), gatt art xx(j) and its chapeau or gatt art xxi(b)(iii). The 
criteria seem open and adaptable enough to be applied to potential situations 
encountered in the future. However, the Appellate Body has not elaborated on 
the relative importance of the factors vis-à-vis each other. The question of im-
portance is left open to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The risk with 
such an approach is that it may leave policymakers in a rather tricky position 
when constructing export controls, because factors that are deemed as essen-
tial domestically might not be perceived as such internationally.
4 Linking Export Controls to Indirect Expropriation
4.1 Background
ftas and bits have long included definitions that deal with the risks of nation-
alisation or expropriatory actions by host governments. Attitudes of arbitral 
tribunals have been consistent as far as the basic conceptualisation of expro-
priation is concerned. For example, in Amoco International Finance Corp v 
Iran, it was held by the Iran – US Claims Tribunal that “[e]xpropriation, which 
can be defined as a compulsory transfer of property rights, may extend to any 
right which can be the object of a commercial transaction”.25
Furthermore, the Iran – US Claims Tribunal noted in Phillips Petroleum Co 
Iran v Iran that expropriation gives rise to liability for compensation regardless 
of “whether the expropriation is formal or de facto and whether the property is 
tangible, such real estate or a factory, or intangible, such as the contractual 
rights involved in the present case”.26
Tribunals have also held that duty to compensate cannot be evaded by the 
host state on the grounds of any narrow meaning accorded to the term “expro-
priation” under municipal law.27
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Amoco International Finance Corp v Iran (Partial Award No. 310-56-3) (1987) 15 Iran–US 
ctr 89, [108].
26 Phillips Petroleum Co Iran v Iran (Award No. 425-39-2) (1989) 21 Iran–US ctr 79, [76].
27 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Egypt (Award on the Merits) (icsid Arbitral 
Tribunal, Case No ARB/84/3, 20 May 1992) [168].
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Indirect expropriation, however, has eluded a specific definition. Arbitral 
tribunals have often referred to the analysis of indirect expropriation as being 
driven by the facts of each claim.28 For example, in Amco Asia Corporation v 
Indonesia, the withdrawal of investment authorisation by a government body 
was treated as an expropriation.29 In Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) 
Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, the cancellation of a tourist development pro-
ject in order to protect antiquities was considered to be an “unquestionable 
attribute of sovereignty” and hence unchallengeable because of public inter-
est.30 However, the tribunal specifically stated that if expropriation is for a le-
gitimate purpose, then it must be accompanied by fair compensation, other-
wise it will amount to confiscation.31 The definition of indirect expropriation 
depends on “the specific facts and circumstances of the case, particularly the 
gravity and length of interference, the rights of the parties under a contract, or 
general legislation, and even cultural elements that define shared expecta-
tions”.32 It is also noteworthy that expropriation and indirect expropriation are 
predicated on the fact that there must be a substantial deprivation of benefits 
or loss of value of investments as a result of governmental action.
In the oft-cited Metalclad v Mexico dispute, the arbitral tribunal explained 
that expropriation may encompass “covert or incidental interference with 
the use of property” which may deprive the owner of “use or reasonably- 
to-be expected economic benefit of property”.33 Similarly, some arbitral 
awards recognise restrictions on property rights, enhanced taxation, altera-
tion of contractual rights or the suspension or withdrawal of licenses and/or 
regulatory permits as measures amounting to indirect expropriation.34 This, 
however, must be contrasted with the proposition that regulatory takings or 
expropriatory actions by states is justified, with or without compensation, if 
28 Yvette Anthony, “The Evolution of Indirect Expropriation Clauses: Lessons from Singa-
pore’s bits/ftas” (2017) 7(2) Asian Journal of International Law 319, 325.
29 Amco Asia Corporation v Indonesia (Award) (1984) 1 icsid Rep 413, [244]–[250].
30 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Egypt (Award on the Merits) (n 27) 
[58]–[129].
31 Ibid [163].
32 Francisco Vicuna, “Carlos Calvo, Honorary nafta Citizen” (2003) 11(1) New York University 
Environmental Law Journal 19, 28, cited by Anthony (n 27) 325.
33 Metalclad Corporation v Mexico (Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, 
30 August 2000) [103].
34 For example, in Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Costa Rica, the tribunal ob-
served that lapse of time can be a relevant factor in determining whether expropriation 
has occurred. This may be of immediate effect (like an outright seizure) or through a se-
ries of interconnected measures that gradually amount to a loss of ownership: Compania 
del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Costa Rica (Final Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case 
No ARB/96/1, 17 February 2000) [76]–[77]. In determining indirect expropriation, some
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the measures are taken in the “public interest” or pursuant to the “police pow-
ers” of a state.35 However, what amounts to “police powers” of a state may vary 
from country to country, according to their municipal systems.
According to analysis by Yvette Anthony, the “police powers” of the state 
and the exercise of powers for “public purpose” or in the “public interest” are 
two different concepts.36 Anthony cites awards in Chemtura, awg and Too v 
Greater Modesto Insurance Associates to stress that the exercise of “police pow-
ers” by the host state does not constitute expropriation.37 Anthony further ob-
serves that the US position on this issue is that a state is not responsible for any 
economic disadvantage incurred by the foreign investor that results from the 
exercise of the state’s bona fide “police powers”. Factors such as the discrimina-
tory application of governmental measures, the extent of deprivation or loss of 
control over investment and the circumstances of each case may be consid-
ered when determining whether “police powers” degenerate into expropria-
tion. Such factors are balanced with indicators such as the protection of public 
morality, public welfare, health and the environment to determine what con-
stitutes “public interest”, “public purpose” or “police powers”.38
Therefore, the question becomes, even where states are exercising legiti-
mate “police powers” to achieve a “public welfare” aim or the preservation of 
the environment, whether the duty to compensate the foreign investor is then 
triggered or not. This is a question that continues to receive extensive academ-
ic attention but which exceeds the scope of this article. Suffice here to say that 
no clear answers have emerged from isds jurisprudence, and recourse is made 
 awards have indicated that the effect of state measures and the degree of loss suffered by 
foreign investor is the operative factor, rather than the intent behind the state measures: 
 Anthony (n 28) 325; see also Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v Mexico (Award) (icsid 
Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/02/1, 17 July 2006) [176(f)]. The tribunal in Spyridon 
Roussalis v Romania declared that the effect of actions of the state is the key to determine 
whether indirect expropriation has occurred or not: Spyridon Roussalis v Romania 
(Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/06/1, 7 December 2011) [327]–[328].
35 See, eg, the discussions in Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of In-
vestment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 341, 358; see 
also Anthony (n 28) 319, 327; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2008) 624; Surya Subedi, International Investment 
Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing, 2nd ed, 2012) 79, 119, 124.
36 Anthony (n 28) 332.
37 Chemtura Corporation v Canada (Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2008-
01, 2 August 2010) [266]; awg Group v Argentina (Decision on Liability) (icsid Arbitral 
Tribunal, Case No ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010) [139]; Too v Greater Modesto Insurance Associ-
ates (1989) 23 Iran–US ctr 378.
38 Anthony (n 28) 332; see also American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States (1987) § 712 cmt (g) (“Third Restatement”).
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to a case-by-case approach to determine the question of whether compensa-
tion is payable or not.
In addition to the “police powers” arguments, disputes such as Tecmed v 
United Mexican States39 and others40 highlight the approach of “legitimate ex-
pectations” that foreign investors may have considered when making the deci-
sion to invest.41 The doctrine of legitimate expectations has gradually morphed 
39 See generally Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v Mexico (Award) (icsid Arbitral Tri-
bunal, Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003) [154] (“Tecmed”).
40 Other disputes following the Tecmed line of argument include LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E 
Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v Argentina (Decision on Liability) (icsid Arbi-
tral Tribunal, Case No ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006) [127]; Occidental Exploration and Pro-
duction Company v Ecuador (Final Award) (London Court of International Arbitration, 
Case No UN 3467, 1 July 2004) [185]; cms Gas Transmission Company v Argentina (Award) 
(icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/01/08, 12 May 2005) [279]; Sempra Energy Interna-
tional v Argentina (Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/02/16, 28 September 
2007) [298]. The Tecmed standard is criticised by Zachary Douglas as an example of “per-
fect public regulation in a perfect world, …which all states should aspire but very few (if 
any) will ever attain”: Zachary Douglas, “Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Ar-
bitration: Occidental, Eureko and Methanex” (2006) 22(1) Arbitration International 27, 28.
41 Academics have highlighted the varied nature of the concept of legitimate practice. 
For example, Michele Potesta highlights the utility of using legitimate expectations in 
situations where an investor is induced on the basis of informal representations by the 
host country: Michele Potesta, “Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Un-
derstanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept” (2013) 28(1) icsid Re-
view 88, 103–110, 121–122. Christopher Campbell, however, is more critical of the concept 
and terms it as an “invention of arbitrators”, stating, moreover, that arbitral tribunals are 
grounding their decisions by citing other arbitral awards that do not carry precedent val-
ue and, hence, the doctrine should be rejected as providing any basis on which to judge 
state conduct: Christopher Campbell, “House of Cards: The Relevance of Legitimate Ex-
pectations under Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions in Investment Treaty Law” 
(2013) 30(4) Journal of International Arbitration 361, 378–379. Elizabeth Snodgrass, on the 
other hand, is more accepting of the doctrine. She argues that the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations should be recognised as a general principle of law on the basis of a compara-
tive survey of various European Union jurisdictions: see Elizabeth Snodgrass, “Protect-
ing Investors’ Legitimate Expectations: Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle” 
(2006) 21(1) icsid Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal 1, 56–58. Christoph Schreuer 
and Ursula Kriebaum offer a more balanced view, arguing that not every expectation 
upon which a foreign investor makes a business decision can form the basis of an expro-
priation claim against foreign investor. Schreuer and Ursula point out that the application 
of the legitimate expectation’s argument is quite situational, especially in complex trans-
actions. In order for foreign investors to rely on legitimate expectations, the foreign inves-
tor must have knowledge and basis on which reasonable expectations can take a busi-
ness decision. These bases can be grounded in general regulatory framework or through 
governmental assurances: see Christoph Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum, “At What Time 
Must Legitimate Expectations Exist?” in Jacques Werner and Arif Hyder Ali (eds), A Liber 
 Amicorum: Thomas Wälde. Law beyond Conventional Thought (cmp Publishing, 2009) 265, 
269–270, 273–276.
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from its initial beginnings as an obiter dictum in the Tecmed award. Within the 
larger framework of isds, the doctrine of legitimate expectations occupies an 
uneasy posture when juxtaposed with a host state’s right to regulate in the 
public interest. The doctrine of legitimate expectation views the stability and 
predictability of the regulatory system as a function of the fair and equitable 
treatment to be accorded to the foreign investor. In doing so, the foreign inves-
tor may have a legitimate expectation that, during the subsistence of the in-
vestment, the domestic regulatory framework would not be altered or modi-
fied in any way.42
Clearly, the expectation by foreign investors that there will never be regula-
tory intervention or legislative reform is unrealistic and problematic. Indeed, 
this proposition has received some recognition, for example in Impregilo v Ar-
gentina, where the dispute settlement tribunal stated that the legitimate ex-
pectations of foreign investors cannot be that the state will not modify its leg-
islation. However, foreign investors are entitled to protection from unreasonable 
modifications of the legislative framework.43
Another aspect of the legitimate-expectations argument is that the govern-
ment of the host state will be bound by any undertakings or representations 
given to the foreign investor prior to the foreign investment being made.44 In 
Thunderbird v Mexico, the tribunal tackled the question of legitimate expecta-
tions based on a legal opinion rendered by a governmental department. Inter-
estingly, the tribunal held that legal advice cannot constitute the basis for le-
gitimate expectations unless the foreign investor discloses the full and 
complete nature of the investment in advance.45 Even when the advice is of 
a  more informal nature, tribunals have been cautious in classifying such 
42 cms Gas Transmission Company v Argentina (Award) (n 40) [274]–[276].
43 Impregilo SpA v Argentina (Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/07/17, 21 June 
2011) [291]–[292]; see further arguments in Potesta (n 41) 117.
44 See, eg, the discussion in Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of Interna-
tional Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 148–149; see also Anirud-
dha Rajput and Sarthak Malhotra, “Legitimate Expectations in Investment Arbitration: 
A Comparative Perspective” in Mahendra Pal Singh and Niraj Kumar (eds), The Indian 
Yearbook of Comparative Law (Springer, 2018) 297, 302–303.
45 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mexico (Award) (North American Free 
Trade Agreement Chapter 11 Tribunal, 26 January 2006) [145], [147]–[148], [155], [166]. 
Thomas Wälde’s separate opinion in the Thunderbird case highlights that the “quite high” 
threshold for assurances and specific representations can only be met if the assurances 
visibly display an official character: International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mex-
ico (Separate Opinion of Thomas Wälde) (North American Free Trade Agreement Chapter 
11 Tribunal, 26 January 2006) [32]; See also Potesta,(n 41) 105–107.
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representations as specific enough to give rise to a breach the fair and equita-
ble standards under the legitimate expectations argument.46
Disputes involving indirect expropriation have also received attention un-
der the proportionality principle, which entails evaluating a range of possible 
regulatory measures and opting for the least intrusive course of action.47 Re-
cent arbitral awards have also considered the interplay between proportional-
ity and reasonableness. Detailed treatment of this issue, however, is beyond 
the scope of this article. Here, proportionality is being briefly discussed as an 
alternative approach to the sole effects or police powers doctrine.
Proportionality seeks to achieve a balance between the competing impera-
tives of governmental regulations and the commercial interests of foreign 
investors. It does so by posing four interlinked queries which must be satis-
fied: (i) the measure must be seen to achieve a legitimate aim; (ii) the measure 
must be suitable to the achieve that aim; (iii) the test of necessity must be 
 applied;48 and (iv) the measure must be balanced against competing interests, 
46 This is seen in the high profile Metalclad case as well as in White Industries v India, where 
a governmental official made a statement describing the Australian and Indian legal sys-
tems as similar. The tribunal termed such a statement as too broad and non-specific to 
trigger legitimate expectations: White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India 
(Final Award), (Ad Hoc Tribunal under the uncitral Arbitration Rules, 30 November 
2011) [5.2.6], [10.3.17].
47 See, eg, Caroline Henckels, Proportionality and Deference in Investor-State Arbitration 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015) 23–26; see also Caroline Henckels, “Indirect Expro-
priation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard 
of Review in Investor-State Arbitration” (2012) 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law 
223, 224–228; see also Benedict Kingsbury and Stephen W Schill, “Public Law Concepts to 
Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest: The Con-
cept of Proportionality” in Stephen W Schill (ed), International Investment Law and Com-
parative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 75, 77–88.
48 The “necessity” test under the proportionality principle has a peculiar overlap with 
the equivalent term in wto jurisprudence. Mitchell and Henckels consider the ne-
cessity analysis conducted by the arbitral tribunals to be more fragmented than the 
wto jurisprudence on the area. One particularly relevant argument by Mitchell and 
Henckels is that wto jurisprudence provides a useful source for guiding investment 
tribunals in determining necessity because wto panels have displayed appropriate 
institutional sensitivity and deference to national autonomy in their analysis: Andrew 
Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, “Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of 
“Necessity” in International Investment Law and wto Law” (2013) 14(1) Chicago Journal 
of International Law 93, 126–137, 160,163; see also Mads Andenas and Stefan Zlepting, 
“Proportionality: wto Law in Comparative Perspective” (2007) 42(3) Texas International 
Law Journal, 371, 383.
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by  weighing and balancing the social importance of achieving the measure’s 
aims against the social importance of harm avoidance.49
Similar to the doctrine of legitimate expectations, arbitral practice shows a 
mixed usage of the proportionality principle. For example, Saluka v Czech Re-
public shows an early attempt to use proportionality in order to explain the 
failure by the Czech Republic to extend fair and equitable treatment to foreign 
investment by the claimant (Saluka).50 On closer inspection, the Saluka award 
seems more in the line of “police powers” rather than setting a new standard.51 
The Saluka rule is succinctly summarised by Prabhash Ranjan as providing 
that “a bona fide, non-discriminatory measure adopted for public welfare ob-
jective is not expropriation, notwithstanding the economic impact on foreign 
investment”.52
The proportionality doctrine, in terms of the lawfulness of a state action, 
received more attention in the American Silver v Bolivia dispute, which con-
cerned a Bolivian governmental action of ordering the revocation of mining 
licences and the reversion of land ownership to the land’s indigenous own-
ers.53 The tribunal explained that, contrary to the assertion by the claimant 
(American Silver), social benefit cannot be equated with purely economic ben-
efit, seen through the lens of the expected economic benefit for the local com-
munities, while ignoring the surrounding political and socio-economic situa-
tion in the region.54
The tribunal also interpreted the strict proportionality standard and stipu-
lated that the economic loss for the investor cannot have more weight than the 
protection of the interests of the indigenous people.55 For the tribunal in the 
49 See, eg, a summary of the proportionality approach in Henckels, Proportionality and Def-
erence in Investor-State Arbitration (n 47) 24–26; see also Aharon Barak, Proportionality 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 131, 357, 484.
50 Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (Partial Award) (Ad Hoc Tribunal under the un-
citral Arbitration Rules, 17 March 2006); see further discussion in George S Georgiev, 
“The Award in Saluka Investments v Czech Republic” in Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and W 
Michael Reisman (eds), The Reasons Requirement in International Investment Arbitration 
(Nijhoff, 2008) 149, 150.
51 Prabhash Ranjan, “Police Powers, Indirect Expropriation in International Investment 
Law, and Article 31(3)(c) of the vclt: A Critique of Philip Morris v Uruguay” (2019) 9(1) 
Asian Journal of International Law 98, 114–115.
52 Ibid 115.
53 South American Silver Ltd v Bolivia (Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 
2013–15, 22 November 2018) [169]; see also the discussion in Lasse Langfeldt, “Proportion-
ality in Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Necessity for Tribunals to Adopt a Clear 
Methodology” (llm Thesis, Uppsala University, 2019) 24–26.
54 South American Silver Ltd v Bolivia (Award) (n 53) [578].
55 Ibid [578].
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American Silver dispute, the initial point of investigation for the purposes of 
meeting the proportionality standard was to investigate whether the fta or 
bit that drove the investment (in this case, the United Kingdom–Bolivia bit)56 
mentioned the proportionality standard or not. In this dispute, the United 
Kingdom–Bolivia bit did not specifically address the standard of a proportion-
ate response in relation to expropriation.57 In fact, the very reason that the 
tribunal discussed proportionality was because the parties addressed the re-
version as an issue from the perspective of proportionality.58 In rreef v Spain, 
the tribunal considered proportionality as being closely connected to reasona-
bleness,59 which is somewhat distinct from the earlier Tecmed characterisation 
of a regulatory measure as not being expropriatory where a reasonable rela-
tionship of proportionality can be established between the burden imposed by 
regulatory measures on foreign investors and the aims that the challenged 
measures are designed to achieve.60 Regardless of the approaches and arbitral 
practices which have developed for explaining direct and indirect expropria-
tion, the older generation of bits and ftas were more circumspect about the 
question of expropriation. Such bits and ftas included broadly worded provi-
sions which mentioned the duty of prompt and adequate compensation but 
did not include specific mechanisms in the texts. Prominent examples include 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (“nafta”) art 1110,61 the Australia–
Thailand fta art 912,62 the Indonesia–Thailand bit art vi63 and the Singapore–
China bit art 6.64
56 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed 24 May 1988, [1990] ukts 34 (entered into force 16 February 1990).
57 South American Silver Ltd v Bolivia (Award) (n 53) [570].
58 See Langfeldt (n 53) 26.
59 rreef Instructure Ltd and rreef Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sàrl v Spain (Deci-
sion on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No 
ARB/13/30, 30 December 2018) [463]–[468].
60 See Tecmed (n 39) [121]–[122]; see also the discussion in Ranjan (above n 51) 116.
61 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada–Mexico–United States, signed 17 De-
cember 1992, 32 ilm 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994).
62 See Australia–Thailand Free Trade Agreement, signed 5 July 2004, [2005] ats 2 (entered 
into force 1 January 2005).
63 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 17 Febru-
ary 1998 (entered into force 5 November 1998).
64 See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Exchange of Letters), 
China–Singapore, signed 21 November 1985 (entered into force 7 February 1986).
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The newer generation of ftas and bits now prescribe detailed expropria-
tion provisions, including “carve outs”, which expressly exclude public welfare 
objectives from the competence of the arbitral tribunals examining expro-
priation claims. Some examples of such provisions in the “new wave” of ftas 
and bits that include greater details and specificity are the asean Comprehen-
sive Investment Agreement (“acia”) annex 2,65 the Comprehensive and Progres-
sive Trans-Pacific Partnership (“cptpp”) annexes 9-B and 9-C,66 the Canada– 
European Union (“EU”) Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement 
(“ceta”) art 8.12,67 the EU–Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement art 2.7 
and the accompanying Annex 4 (Understanding on Expropriation).68 These 
new wave ftas and bits contain greater details instructing future arbitral pan-
els (or in case of ceta and the EU–Vietnam fta, the newly constituted bilat-
eral investment courts) on the factors which cause government conduct to 
amount to a legitimate exercise of governmental “police powers”. In doing so, 
countries are eliminating the possibility of arbitral tribunals introducing their 
own interpretations in the dispute. However, even in the new wave ftas and 
bits, the concepts of “public purpose” and “legitimate public policy” are nei-
ther clarified nor defined. Hence, challenges by foreign investors can be 
mounted against state measures by questioning their legitimacy.
4.2 Underlying Assumptions: Can Export Controls by a Host State 
Amount to Indirect Expropriation?
Certain assumptions will be made for the purposes of the subject query. These 
are necessary to connect two otherwise unrelated concepts (export control is a 
trade measure, whereas indirect expropriation is an investment concept). 
However, both concepts spring from governmental action. The assumptions 
are summarised hereinbelow:
Assumption 1: An investment being expropriated is controlled by a for-
eign investor and is made under an existing fta or bit;
Assumption 2: The main aim behind an investment is the processing 
and export of certain product(s). The services sector is excluded. Exports 
constitute a major share of the revenue of the investor;
65 See asean Comprehensive Investment Agreement, signed 26 February 2009 (entered into 
force 24 February 2012) (“acia”).
66 See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, signed 8 
March 2018, [2018] ats 23 (entered into force 30 December 2018).
67 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, signed 30 October 2016 (not yet in force).
68 EU – Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement, signed 30 June 2019 (not yet in force).
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Assumption 3: Export controls are imposed pursuant to a governmen-
tal policy and cause revenue-based damages to the foreign investor, due 
to the price difference between domestic and international sales; and
Assumption 4: Export controls are applied across the board and affect 
local and foreign-owned businesses equally. Therefore, violation of na-
tional treatment (“NT”) norms is not at issue.
4.3 Simulated Scenarios
An overlap between the gatt art xx exceptions and the commonly cited pub-
lic welfare and environmental grounds is immediately apparent. One particu-
larly relevant exception, discussed above, is gatt art xx(j), pursuant to which 
a wto member can adopt measures restricting exports in order to alleviate 
“general or local short supply”. Using gatt art xx(j), and the assumptions out-
lined above, the following simulated scenarios are constructed to explain the 
proposition that export controls may amount to indirect expropriation.
The first scenario is based on Country X, a resource-based economy with a 
shrinking manufacturing base, that attracts foreign direct investment into the 
resources sector. The government of Country X grants concessions and tax 
breaks for foreign investors who wish to engage in development and explora-
tion in the natural resource sector. In one case, Corporation A (a large, multi-
national gas company owned by foreign investors based in a bit state party) 
heavily invests in the exploration for, and refining of, natural gas in Country X. 
Corporation A’s business strategy is to export the bulk of output to Asia, where 
there is high demand for gas. Country X is facing high domestic energy prices. 
The prices in the Asian export markets, however, are lower than the price in 
Country X. The government of Country X notices the price differential and sees 
establishment of new gas-fired power plants as the solution for securing ener-
gy needs and bringing down the domestic price of gas. Accordingly, Country X 
systematically imposes export controls on gas to increase domestic supply. 
Country X justifies the new policies on the grounds of energy security, price 
stabilisation, the rights of people over their own resources, social license and 
acting in the larger public interest. The export controls are introduced in the 
form of quotas, which results in a reduction in the volume of refined gas that 
Corporation A can export. Resultantly, Corporation A’s projected revenue de-
creases for the duration of export controls, while this news further affects the 
stocks of Corporation A. Has Country X indirectly expropriated Corporation 
A’s investment through its export controls?
The second scenario is based on Country Y, a highly populated, developing 
country that is increasingly penetrating the developed markets with its 
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 cheaply-produced consumer goods. Country Y launches an ambitious plan to 
advance its manufacturing sectors and create additional job opportunities 
within the economy. The government imposes a five-year export control over 
certain raw materials and rare earths. The plan is to inwardly divert raw materi-
als for use in the domestic manufacturing of value-added products for export. 
The export controls come in the form of increased tariffs added to the free-on-
board (“fob”) price. The increased tariffs will be phased out over a five-year 
period. Resultantly, the export prices of rare earths increase, which conse-
quently affects the price in the world market as well. In one case, Corporation 
B (an international mining business, incorporated as a company under the 
laws of Country Y) is engaged in mining and processing rare earths, which are 
exported in the form of ingots to specialised businesses overseas. Corporation 
B has invested in significant infrastructure for mining, processing and export-
ing rare earths. The measures by Country Y are forcing Corporation B to reduce 
its exports and divert its sales into the domestic market. Corporation B is fur-
ther prevented from pursuing additional supply opportunities due to export 
controls. Corporation B believes that supplying domestic industries is not lu-
crative enough in the long run, and that the loss of additional business oppor-
tunities overseas has seriously affected the revenues of the business. Has 
Country Y indirectly expropriated Corporation B’s investment through its ex-
port controls?
The third scenario is a deliberately constructed situation involving a mix of 
regulatory intervention and confiscatory actions. In this scenario, the govern-
ment of Country Z, a least developed country (“ldc”) that is a venue for out-
ward production processing (“opp”)-based investment by overseas apparel 
companies, exceeds the scope of proportionality and necessity while purport-
edly acting in the public interest. The opp businesses working in Country Z 
engage a vast number of employees in order to export their finished apparel. 
The export-oriented commercial and manufacturing activity is a valuable 
source of revenue for Country Z’s economy. The apparel and textiles businesses 
in Country Z often source cotton yarn from domestic cotton yarn manufactur-
ers, who in turn rely on cotton growers in Country Z to supply them with raw 
cotton. The cotton yarn manufacturers primarily supply their products domes-
tically and any surplus is exported. Due to a sudden and unforeseen shortage of 
cotton yarn internationally, cotton yarn manufacturers see a spike in demand 
from overseas buyers and begin exporting yarn to maximise their profits, lead-
ing to domestic yarn shortages which affect local apparel manufacturing. Sev-
eral delivery orders are delayed or cancelled because the manufacturers were 
unable to source cotton yarn domestically. The representative association of 
apparel manufacturers approach the government of Country Z and demand 
that export controls be imposed on cotton yarn manufacturers. The cotton 
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yarn manufacturers resist these demands. The crisis spirals out of control and 
results in rioting and protests. In one instance, a mob burns a warehouse 
owned by Corporation C (a company registered under the laws of Country Z, 
but with a majority shares owned by foreign shareholders through a local hold-
ing company). Corporation C runs a vertically integrated operation, which in-
volves feeding cotton yarn into its textiles and apparel facilities. The final out-
puts are then exported as value-added items. Under increasing pressure from 
the apparel industries and labour unions, the government of Country Z im-
poses export controls on cotton yarn until domestic supplies are stabilised. 
The government further confiscates all cotton yarn in port warehouses that is 
destined for exports. Corporation C feels aggrieved by the actions of Country Z 
and the foreign investors (the shareholders of Corporation C) view this action 
as expropriatory. Has Country C indirectly expropriated Corporation C’s in-
vestment through its export controls and confiscatory actions?
With the above simulations summarising the basic positions of the impos-
ing countries, potential arguments on export controls qualifying as indirect 
expropriation will now be discussed.
4.4 Arguments
The simulated scenarios illustrate instances where government actions have 
affected foreign investors’ ability to export and earn profits. The decision to 
control exports can either be classified under the broader category of “police 
powers” of the state or actions taken in the “public interest” or for “public wel-
fare”. Alternatively, the expropriatory actions can be viewed through the lens of 
proportionality or the legitimate expectations of the foreign investor. The clas-
sification is important because the result may alter the outcome of the isds 
process, and may well affect the terms of compensation available to the foreign 
investors. Also, the expressions “police powers”, “public interest” and “public 
welfare” have no universally accepted legal definition. Therefore, the only indi-
cators are treatment of the issue under the principles of customary interna-
tional law, in academic literature and/or by various arbitral tribunals consti-
tuted under ftas and bits.
The question of indirect expropriation and its difference from non- 
compensable taking under an exercise of “police powers” of the state is equally 
important to both foreign investors and governments. According to Dolzer and 
Stevens, for the foreign investor:69
69 Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, 1995) 98, quoted in Organisation on Economic Co-operation and Development, 
“‘Indirect Expropriation’ and the ‘Right to Regulate’ in International Investment Law” 
(Working Paper on International Investment No 2004/04, September 2004) 5.
0004664868.INDD   95 12/24/2019   7:26:21 PM
Ghori96
204206
[t]he line of demarcation between measures for which no compensation 
is due and actions qualifying as indirect expropriations (that require 
compensation) may well make the difference between the burden to op-
erate (or abandon) a non-profitable enterprise and the right to receive 
full compensation (either from the host State or from an insurance con-
tract). For the host State, the definition determines the scope of the 
State’s power to enact legislation that regulates the rights and obligations 
of owners in instances where compensation may fall due.
Sornarajah considers that governmental measures related to “anti-trust, con-
sumer protection, securities, environmental protection, land planning are 
non-compensable takings since they are regarded as essential to the efficient 
functioning of the state”.70 However, any powers of the state that are exercised 
must be non-discriminatory.71 Arbitral awards such as Chemtura Corporation v 
Government of Canada hold that the exercise of states’ police powers must be 
linked to imperatives such as the protection of human health and the environ-
ment.72 In Saur International SA v Argentina, the tribunal stipulated that in 
certain situations, the legitimate exercise of police powers of the state does not 
give rise to an obligation to compensate.73
Adding to the problem of legitimacy is the fact that any state can view its 
actions in the public realm as “necessary” to achieve a stated public purpose. 
The problem of necessity featured in several wto cases such as Korea – Beef,74  
70 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1994) 283, cited in ibid 4–5.
71 See, eg, Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 9th ed, 1992) 919–920; BP Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd v Libya (1973) 
53 ilr 297, 329 (“BP Exploration”); Methanex Corporation v United States (Final Award on 
Jurisdiction and Merits) (2005) 44 ilm 1345, 1456 (“Methanex (Final Award)”); Veijo Heis-
kanen, “The Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the Development 
of the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation” (2003) 5(3) International Law Forum 176, 179, 
185; Ben Mostafa, “The Sole Effects Doctrine, Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation 
under International Law” (2008) 15(15) Australian International Law Journal 265, 272–274.
72 Chemtura Corporation v Canada (Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2008-
01, 2 August 2010) [266], cited in Anthony (n 28) 329.
73 saur International SA v Argentina (Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability) (icsid Arbitral 
Tribunal, Case No ARB/04/4, 6 June 2012) [398], cited in Anthony (n 28) 329.
74 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef, wto Doc WT/DS161/AB/R; WT/DS169/AB/R (11 December 2000) (“Korea – Beef, Ap-
pellate Body Report”). In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body held that the term “necessary”, 
within the meaning of gatt art xx(d), requires a weighing and balancing of several fac-
tors which include the contribution of the compliance measure in enforcement of the 
law in question, the importance of common interests or values protected by the law and 
the impact of law on “imports or exports”: at [164].
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EC – Asbestos,75 EC – Tariff Preferences,76 US – Gambling77 and Brazil – 
 Retreaded Tyres.78 In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, for example, the Appellate Body 
75 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbes-
tos-Containing Products, wto Doc WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001) (“EC – Asbestos, 
 Appellate Body Report”). In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body analysed the interpretation 
of “reasonably available” alternatives in order to determine whether French import re-
strictions were “necessary” within the meaning of gatt art xx(b): at [170], [173]–[175].
76 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Pref-
erences to Developing Countries, wto Doc WT/DS246/AB/R (7 April 2004) (“EC – Tariff 
Preferences, Appellate Body Report”); Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions 
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, wto Doc WT/DS246/R 
(1 December 2003) (“EC – Tariff Preferences, Panel Report”). The EC – Tariff Preferences 
case demonstrates that interpretation of “necessary” must be coupled with proven “effec-
tiveness” of the trade measures (in this case, the EU’s European Generalised System of 
Preferences (“gsp”) scheme). The EU justified the scheme on the grounds that gsp tariff 
pre ferences promoted the “development of alternative economic activities to replace il-
licit drug production and trafficking” which, therefore, satisfied the standard under gatt 
art xx(b). The dispute settlement panel disagreed, and stated that the scheme was devel-
opmental in nature, with an emphasis on promotion of sustainable development in devel-
oping countries, which would mean that EU’s defence under gatt art xx(b) was invalid. 
The panel cited the declining utility of gsp schemes due to global tariff reduction under 
wto obligations, along with a lack of monitoring and compliance mechanisms for meas-
uring “effectiveness” of the gsp scheme and the availability of less trade restrictive options. 
The panel concluded that the part of the EC gsp schemes relating to drug arrangements 
was not “necessary” to protect human life or health: [4.92]–[4.99], [7.211], [7.219] –[7.223]. 
The valuable takeaway for policymakers from the EC – Tariff Preferences case is that if a 
country adopts export controls and then seeks to justify them under the “necessary” stand-
ard, the measures must be factually proven as effective to achieve the stated goals.
77 The case concerned Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 unts 3 (entered into force 1995) annex B (“Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services”) art xiv(a), which is identically worded to gatt art 
xx(a). The meaning of the term “necessary” was pinned to earlier jurisprudence (ie, as-
sessing the “relative importance” of the interests or values promoted by the challenged 
measure, contribution of the measure to the achievement of the aims pursued by it, re-
strictive impact of the measure on international trade, weighed and measured with the 
interests or values, and, finally, a comparison between the challenged measure and pos-
sible alternatives available): Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, wto Doc WT/DS285/AB/R (7 April 
2005) [291], [304]–[309] (“US – Gambling, Appellate Body Report”). The Appellate Body 
also noted that “it is not the responding party’s burden to show … that there are no rea-
sonably available alternatives to achieve its objectives” and that “a responding party need 
not identify the universe of less trade-restrictive alternative measures and then show that 
none of those measures achieves the desired objective”: at [309]. Instead, the responding 
party must make a case that its measures are “necessary” by adducing evidence that allow 
the dispute settlement panels to assess the challenged measure in the light of the relevant 
factors to be “weighed and balanced” in a case: at [310]–[311].
78 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, wto Doc 
WT/DS332/AB/R (3 December 2007) (“Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Report”); 
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recognized the fundamental principle that wto members have the right to 
determine the level of protection necessary to achieve a public policy goal.79 
In the first scenario (discussed above), the government of Country X can justify 
its measures as “necessary” under gatt art xx(d) by pointing to a short supply 
of gas which is leading to high energy prices within the country. To do so ef-
fectively, the challenge for Country X is to construct the export controls under 
the Korea – Beef approach by considering the possible alternatives which are 
reasonably available and then to further ensure that the “effectiveness” criteria 
is met, as highlighted in the EC – Tariff Preferences case.
Alternatively, Country X can consider pursuing an argument under gatt art 
xx(j), by claiming that export controls are “essential” to the distribution of 
products in “general or local short supply”. To do so, the government of Coun-
try X must consider two factors: firstly, the “essential” criterion, and then the 
meaning of the term “general or local short supply” in the India – Solar Cells 
case.80 In determining the meaning of “essential”, the Appellate Body in India – 
Solar Cells endorsed a test similar to the “necessary” test under gatt art xx(d) 
 Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, wto Doc WT/DS332/ 
AB/R (12 June 2007) (“Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Panel Report”).
79 The term “necessary” received further treatment in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, where the 
subject was Brazil’s ban and penalties on the import and marketing of, and dealing with, 
retreaded tyres. Brazil’s regional trading partners in the Mercosur regime received exemp-
tions. Brazil cited the “necessary” argument under gatt art xx(b) and (d). The case il-
lustrates an acknowledgment by the wto that wto Members have the right to determine 
the appropriate level of protection as per their public policy. The Appellate Body en-
dorsed the panel’s finding that the import ban on retreaded tyres can be provisionally 
justified: Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Report (n 78), [145]. The panel “weighed 
and balanced” the contribution of the import restrictions in the context of the stated 
objective of the Brazilian policy. The panel then considered alternatives suggested by the 
complainant, and held that the suggested measures did not constitute “reasonably avail-
able” alternatives to the import restrictions: Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Re-
port (n 78), [157]; See also Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Panel Report (n 78) [7.159]. The Appel-
late Body further noted that even where the contribution of the measures is not 
immediately observable, the measure could still be considered “necessary” encourages 
policymakers to closely scrutinise factors that contribute to the overall objective of the 
trade restrictive measure: Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body Report (n 78), [210]–
[212]. The wto seems to be endorsing a position where the expectation is that the impos-
ing Member has undertaken a comparative analysis of the measure in light of possible, 
less-trade restrictive alternatives, while at the same time, the complaining wto Member, 
is afforded the opportunity to identify possible less-trade restrictive measures that the 
responding Member could have taken.
80 The term “essential”, according to the Appellate Body, ranks closer to the “indispensable” 
end of the continuum than the word “necessary”: India – Solar Cells, Appellate Body Re-
port (n 7) [5.62].
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which involves “weighing and balancing” a series of factors.81 Secondly, Coun-
try X must consider the meaning of the term “general or local short supply” as 
enunciated by the Appellate Body in India – Solar Cells. The Appellate Body 
stated that in settling the question of “general or local short supply”, regard 
must be given to:82
[t]he total quantity of imports that may be available to meet demand in 
a particular geographical area or market. It may … be relevant to consider 
the extent to which international supply of a product is stable and acces-
sible, including … distance between a particular geographical area or 
market and production sites, as well as reliability of local or transnational 
supply chains. Whether and which factors are relevant necessarily de-
pend on the particularities of each case.
The Appellate Body held that, regardless of the occurrence of factors in each 
case, the responding party (namely, the party imposing the export control) has 
the burden to demonstrate that the quantity of available supply, from both 
domestic and international sources, to the relevant geographical market is in-
sufficient to meet demand.83
No country has so far faced an accusation of expropriation in relation to 
export controls. If policymakers in a developing country design an investment 
policy, considerations that have been highlighted in India – Solar Cells provide 
a workable template in dealing with any future “general or local short supply” 
issue. Looking ahead, if these considerations are satisfied, a host country can 
adopt a “police powers”-based approach to argue that export controls are not 
expropriatory in nature and that the government had acted to alleviate “gen-
eral or local short supply”.
Indirect expropriation is usually connected to imperatives such as health 
and the environment. Devaluing the investment of a foreign investor(s) is of-
ten a by-product of governmental measures, which then leads to a claim of 
indirect expropriation by the affected foreign investor(s). Therefore, for Coun-
try X, the challenges in constructing export controls is to not only satisfy the 
gatt obligations owed to other countries (where importers are based), but 
also to ensure that any investor who may be damaged by export controls is un-
able to lodge a claim under any bit or fta signed by Country X. Hence, the ori-
gin of the foreign investor is an important factor to consider before imposing 
81 Ibid [5.63] (emphasis added).
82 Ibid [6.4].
83 Ibid.
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the export control. For example, assuming that Country X is already in a bit 
with another country (Country D) and that investors (Corporation A) based in 
Country D have invested in the gas sector of Country X with the aim of extract-
ing, refining and exporting gas from Country X, then any measures that restrict 
the Corporation A’s stated rationale for investment can become the basis of a 
claim against Country X for indirect expropriation. Country X may be liable to 
pay compensation to Corporation A, however, this finding depends on a series 
of inter-connected factors such as legitimate expectations, the terms of the 
bit, the proportionality and necessity of the adopted measures, and how the 
expropriation clauses are constructed within the underlying bit. In any isds 
setting, Country X will most likely demonstrate that actions were undertaken 
pursuant to the police powers of the state, in order to ensure stable gas supply 
in the country, while Corporation A’s strategy will be to claim compensation 
for indirect expropriation due to lost revenue and loss of share value. Alterna-
tively, the government of Country X will seek to adopt an argument based in 
the proportionality, legitimacy and necessity analysis highlighted in more re-
cent disputes such as rreef v Spain and American Silver.84
One argument which may work in the favour of Country X is that if products 
are considered in “general or local short supply” under gatt art xx(j), then 
this automatically boosts the public interest argument which, by implication, 
can settle the issue of the police powers of the state as well. In simpler terms, 
states have the right to ensure that their people have access to the basic re-
sources needed for living (such as access to food, water, affordable energy and 
security, etc). Resultantly, the claim by Corporation A of indirect expropriation 
based on export controls may stand on a weak basis.
In the case of Country Y (the second scenario discussed above), the out-
come might be somewhat different. In this scenario, export controls are being 
used by the government of Country Y to boost economic activity in the country 
by diverting critical materials inwards through prohibiting their export. Like 
the first scenario, Country Y may face allegations of indirect expropriation if 
the wording of any underlying fta or bit enables Corporation B (the investor) 
to initiate isds proceedings. For this to happen, Corporation B must demon-
strate that it is owned, in terms of shares, by a party and/or shareholder based 
in an fta or bit partner country. However, where Corporation B has an advan-
tage, where claims are concerned, is that powers exercised by the government 
of Country Y are not likely to be interpreted as police powers of the state or 
regulatory powers exercised in the public interest or for public welfare.
84 In this respect, see the arguments above 4.2.
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One can make the argument that governments have the right to adopt eco-
nomic initiatives that result in economic advancement and the creation of jobs, 
but this argument may be on weak footing when it comes to the prejudice suf-
fered by the foreign investor. Hence, Corporation B, in the second scenario, will 
have a stronger claim against Country Y for indirect expropriation. But what if 
Corporation B’s investment was not under any fta or bit that Country Y has 
signed? In such a situation, Corporation B’s efforts to protect its investment 
under an fta or bit will be difficult.85 From the experience of Phillip Morris’s 
claim against Australia’s tobacco plain-packaging regulations, any post facto 
restructuring in order to bring an expropriation claim will likely not succeed.86 
Therefore, as long as Country Y treats investment in a non- discriminatory man-
ner between domestic and foreign investors in the rare earths sector, it may be 
able to evade a claim of expropriation under any fta or bit.
One of the common themes in the first and second scenarios is that they 
both concern natural resources (gas and rare earths). In the second scenario, 
the changes introduced by Country Y are driven largely by economic and po-
litical motivations, whereas in the first scenario, the governmental measures 
are driven by a concern for ensuring stable gas supply. Both scenarios, however, 
hamper the ability of the foreign investors in question to carry out their busi-
ness activity. A pre-emptive solution to the problem may be the incorporation 
of an economic equilibrium clause into the project agreement.87 The econom-
ic equilibrium clause enables stabilisation of the economic return to the inves-
tor, instead of stabilisation of the legal framework.88 Under economic equilib-
rium clauses, host states may be entitled to issue changes that can potentially 
affect the project, but will be bound to consult the foreign investor in order to 
85 Russell Thirgood, Michael Roche and Erika Williams, “Australia: Proposed lng Export 
Restraints and Australian Liability Under International Trade Law”, mondaq (Web Page, 
20 June 2017) <http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/603326/Inward+Foreign+Invest 
ment/Proposed+LNG+export+restrictions+and+Australian+liability+under+internation 
al+trade+law>.
86 Phillip Morris attempted to restructure its investment in Australia to take advantage of 
the bit between Hong Kong and Australia. This was ultimately unsuccessful and held to 
be an abuse of process by the tribunal: ibid.
87 For a brief discussion of the “economic equilibrium clause”, see David Clinch and James 
Watson, “Stabilisation Clauses: Issues and Trends”, Lexology (Web Page, 30 June 2010) 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5976193-1acd-4082-b9e7-87c0 
414b5328>.
88 Stabilisation clauses are contractual protections incorporated within long term invest-
ments between foreign investors and states. Majority of stabilisation clauses appear in 
investment agreements in the oil, gas and resources sector. They can also be found in in-
frastructure and transport projects as well: ibid.
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determine the impact of the proposed changes.89 The parties usually discuss a 
renegotiated framework of investment or, alternatively, the state will pay ap-
propriate compensation to the foreign investor. Moreover, any isds proceed-
ings will be subject to the host states discussing the governmental measures 
with the foreign investors if an economic equilibrium clause has been includ-
ed in the investment framework. However, if parties disagree on the remedial 
measures or the compensation payable, then the foreign investors can weigh 
in on whether to claim indirect expropriation by initiating isds proceedings. 
The feasibility of negotiating economic equilibrium clauses by the foreign in-
vestor may be influenced by a variety of factors, which include but are not 
limited to: the appetite of the government of the host country to enter into 
pre-investment negotiations; the quantum and nature of foreign investments; 
the size and frequency of profit remittance from the host country; the socio-
political sensitivity of the sector in which the foreign investor has invested; and 
the investor’s own understanding of the regulatory standards in the host econ-
omy as well as under the fta or bit umbrella.
In contrast to the first two scenarios, the third scenario has been deliber-
ately constructed to explain a situation where the conduct of the host country 
is composite of direct takings (confiscation), accompanied by export controls 
that make the export of goods unattractive. Confiscation is a clear instance of 
direct expropriation, but export controls, as argued above in the first and sec-
ond scenarios, may only be found to constitute indirect expropriation provid-
ed that certain conditions are met. This may involve the foreign investor show-
ing that the exercise of power by the state did not meet the reasonableness 
standard, which in turn, may involve considering factors such as the legitimacy 
of the state measure’s purpose, its proportionality and necessity, and the suit-
ability of the measure to achieve public welfare.
In the third scenario, a government imposes export controls due to pressure 
from interest groups. The governmental motives are a mixture of factors rang-
ing from unforeseen developments in the international market, economic fac-
tors and its responsibility to maintain employment levels in the country. How-
ever, not all of the aforementioned factors can become grounds for defence 
against a claim for indirect expropriation. For example, in the first and second 
scenarios, exercising police powers or acting in the public welfare can give the 
host state an excuse to resist indirect expropriation claims by foreign investors. 
In the third scenario, the confiscatory action was aimed at placating labour 
unions and local apparel businesses, which is clearly not a public welfare 
89 Ibid.
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 objective. However, there may be a way out for Country Z. It is common knowl-
edge that for many developing countries and ldcs, textiles and clothing are 
often the main value-added industries in their economy. If Country Z can sat-
isfy the art xx(j) standard, it can basically argue that it is acting to allevi-
ate “general or local short supply” in the country. If the measures are adopted 
in a non-discriminatory manner and are applied uniformly to all locally- and 
foreign-owned businesses, then there can be little doubt that such powers are 
part of the police powers of the state, which makes it difficult for the foreign 
investor to claim compensation.
Thus, can it be said that the government of Country Z in the third scenario 
is acting to control exports in order to alleviate “general or local short supply”? 
This query seeks to apply the Appellate Body’s art xx(j) reasoning in India – 
Solar Cells, whilst also determining the broader question whether Country Z’s 
actions are in the public interest. For example, what was the total quantity of 
imports available to meet demand in Country Z? The answer to this query is 
clearly obvious: due to an international shortage, the sourcing of cotton yarn 
through imports was impossible and Country Z’s cotton yarn producers 
emerged as top suppliers (both domestically and internationally). Therefore, 
this factor works in the favour of Country Z’s export controls. Further, the ex-
tent to which international supply of a product is stable and accessible is to be 
considered. Again, the answer is similar to the previous query. The supplies are 
largely from domestic sources which also happen to be proximate to the mar-
ket and production sites within the country. The Appellate Body explained in 
India – Solar Cells that, when determining “general or local short supply”, the 
relevant factors are peculiar to each case.90
Also, the extent to which domestic producers sell their production abroad is 
a relevant factor which was identified by the Appellate Body.91 In the third sce-
nario, cotton yarn producers were inclined to export their yarn rather than sell 
them domestically. These factors indicate that unless Country Z adopts export 
control measures, the domestic clothing sector will suffer immeasurably and 
may lead to rises in unemployment and business losses. Therefore, with the 
proviso that the measures are applied in a non-discriminatory manner, the ex-
port controls imposed by Country Z can potentially be considered as valid un-
der art xx(j) and could give grounds to resist any isds claims that Corporation 
C may bring against Country Z for indirect expropriation. Note, however, that 
Corporation C must distinguish confiscation from export controls. Export con-
trols that may have been imposed by Country Z do not impose an outright ban 
90 India – Solar Cells, Appellate Body Report (n 7) [6.4].
91 India – Solar Cells, Appellate Body Report (n 7) [5.71].
0004664868.INDD   103 12/24/2019   7:26:22 PM
Ghori104
204206
on the exports of cotton yarn. Instead, like the export tariffs on the fob price 
of rare earths discussed in the second scenario, they raise the export duty, with 
the aim of making exports unattractive for some exporters. Confiscation of 
property, on the other hand, is an outright taking which may be classified as 
direct expropriation. Therefore, if Country Z has confiscated any cotton yarn 
owned by Corporation C from the port warehouses, this may give rise to a 
claim for compensation even if the action was for a public purpose.
5 Analysis
5.1 The Two Paths
The challenge confronting any reader of this analysis is explaining the state 
actions from the several, and oft-competing, standpoints of “legitimacy”, “ne-
cessity”, “proportionality”, “legitimate expectations”, “public welfare” and/or 
“police powers”. Are the three presented scenarios explained by the state exer-
cising its regulatory powers, and/or is the state acting pursuant to a legitimate 
public purpose?
To answer this query, the exceptional grounds mentioned in gatt art xx 
have to be holistically considered, since they share a conceptual similarity with 
common grounds of public regulation by states. Investment disputes such as 
the Methanex case indicate that “non-discriminatory regulation for public pur-
pose” can be deemed by arbitral panels as falling within the doctrine of police 
powers.92 This is not different from public interest imperatives that the newer 
generation of ftas and bits refer to, while also constructing “carve out” claus-
es to make room for public welfare exceptions.93
The taxonomy of an export control is also important because there is a con-
vincing line of arbitral cases that designate the exercise of police powers of 
state as non-compensable if done in a non-discriminatory manner. Conversely, 
the exercise of regulatory powers in order to promote public welfare objectives 
is recognised in some modern ftas and bits as not amounting to indirect ex-
propriation. Hence, the actual procedure and the perception of the measure as 
being, or not being, in the public interest assumes greater importance.
92 See discussion in Methanex (Final Award) (n 71) 1456, cited in Mostafa (n 71) 272–274.
93 By way of illustration, acia (n 65) annex 2 (4) specifically provides for carve outs for 
“measures … designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives such as 
public health, safety and the environment”, which will not be considered to constitute 
expropriation.
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As far as export controls are concerned, the Appellate Body in the India – 
Solar Cells case clarifies the meaning of “general or local short supply”. Assum-
ing the restrictions in question are applied uniformly and in a non- 
discriminatory manner, the claim of a foreign investor for compensation may 
be on weak grounds. One possible solution suggested hereinabove was the in-
corporation or negotiation of stabilisation and/or economic equilibrium 
clauses in investment agreements, which will allow foreign investors to have 
their say in managing the fallout of any governmental measures. The first and 
second scenarios discussed previously illustrate that the application of export 
controls in this context will likely not be construed as expropriatory. However, 
such a simplistic approach creates some challenges.
Firstly, actual disruption must be proven by the host state. This may well 
become a key determinant connecting export controls and the foreign inves-
tor’s claim for compensation for expropriation. In absence of a defined crite-
rion, the government of the host state and the foreign investor may end up ar-
guing their subjective interpretation of what is, or should be, the disruption 
that justifies the export controls. Whilst disruptions in the context of interna-
tional trade can be handled under the gatt/wto framework, no centrally 
agreed definitions exist in the realm of international investment law. Further-
more, ftas/bits may consider defining what a disruption may look like, but 
again there are no known ftas or bits that define disruption in a foreign in-
vestment context, particularly where the aim behind foreign investment in the 
host state is to enable foreign investors to export resources or goods.
Secondly, action in response to anticipated shortages or market disruptions 
may be difficult to justify, politically motivated or, quite simply, speculative in 
nature. Should a host state wait until actual disruption occurs, or is a risk as-
sessment of impending shortage sufficient to impose export controls? This is a 
moot point, because foreign investors will argue that no actual disruption and/
or shortage has occurred, and hence that the imposition of export controls is 
expropriatory. Since there are no agreed formulae in international investment 
law to determine imminent market disruption, any attempt to speculate about 
the possible effects of market disruption in the absence of an actual one will 
likely be rejected by arbitral panels, as was the case with the Appellate Body’s 
treatment of India’s argument in India – Solar Cells case.94 Additionally, for-
eign investors and arbitral panels may attempt to interpret questions of public 
94 India – Solar Cells, Appellate Body Report (n 7) [5.76]. The panel in India – Solar Cells held 
that India “had not identified any actual disruptions”, and that solar power developers 
(“spds”) in India have not “experienced an actual disruption in supply”: India – Solar 
Cells, Panel Report (n 20) [7.262].
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interest when determining whether an “actual disruption” has occurred, or is 
likely to occur – a truly unsavoury proposition for most governments indeed. 
It  is clear, from Australia’s jousting with Phillip Morris, that well-endowed, 
multinational corporations (“mncs”) can exert substantial influence on gov-
ernmental authorities, thereby resulting in regulatory chill. States and govern-
mental authorities consider such fettering of their regulatory discretion an 
unwelcome prospect.95
Furthermore, there is a lack of general reporting mechanisms that enable 
the reporting of export controls to parties or countries affected by such meas-
ures.96 The ubiquitous means of notification are the news and electronic me-
dia that may be relied upon by business interests. While the wto does main-
tain a Trade Policy Review Mechanism (“tprm”), which records any export 
restrictions or controls in place, tprm Reports usually come at a four-year in-
terval for some countries (and six years for countries identified as ldcs).97 
Clearly, this mechanism is not useful for the affected parties in circumstances 
where a government announces an export control, which may affect business-
es dependent on goods or commodities that are subject to such controls. Con-
sidering the argument that export controls affecting mncs owned by foreign 
investors may be subject to future disputes, it becomes worthwhile at this stage 
to discuss two possible paths for redress that may be chosen strategically by 
claimants.
5.2 The First Path: wto Dispute Settlement as a Parallel Action to isds
Recourse to wto dispute settlement by a foreign investor is based on the 
premise that export controls have breached gatt/wto obligations owed to 
the country in which the foreign investor is based. This alternative poses sev-
eral challenges. Firstly, the exact breach of wto obligations must be ascer-
tained, and the export controls in question must have violated the terms of the 
gatt/wto framework (ie, the Most-Favoured-Nation (“mfn”) or National 
Treatment (“NT”) obligations, or the factors under gatt arts xi and xx, as ex-
plained through the wto dispute-settlement jurisprudence). Secondly, the 
country in which the foreign investor is based must establish locus standi to 
bring about the complaint in the wto. Thirdly, the wto must grapple with a 
95 Thirgood, Roche and Williams (n 85).
96 Matsushita, “Export Controls of Natural Resources and the wto/gatt Disciplines” (n 8) 
309.
97 See generally “Uruguay Round Agreement: Trade Policy Review Mechanism (trpm)”, 
World Trade Organization (Web Page) <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/29- 
tprm_e.htm>.
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breach of obligations that, quite possibly, may be owed under a different bilat-
eral fta.98 This is where the foreign investor must assess its prospects of suc-
cess, by investigating whether the underlying fta contains a “fork-in-the-
road”99 clause, which requires the investor (claimant) to select whether to 
lodge a claim for compensation in the domestic courts or opt for international 
options.100 However, “fork-in-the-road” clauses only enable selection between 
98 This is a challenging proposition, as is illustrated by the Mexico – Soft Drinks case in the 
wto. See Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Bever-
ages, wto Doc WT/DS308/AB/R (6 March 2006) (“Mexico – Soft Drinks, Appellate Body 
Report”); Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, wto 
Doc WT/DS308/R (7 October 2005) (“Mexico – Soft Drinks, Panel Report”). In Mexico – Soft 
Drinks, the US argued that domestic taxes imposed by Mexico on drinks using non-cane 
sugar breached the NT obligations that Mexico owed the US under gatt. Mexico justi-
fied its measures because the measures were in response to the US breaching its market 
access commitments negotiated under nafta on trade in sugar, while the US-origin 
high-fructose corn syrup (“hfcs”) (a sugar alternative used as input in manufacturing of 
beverages) enjoyed continued preferential access to the Mexican market. Furthermore, 
Mexico claimed that the US continuously refused to submit to the nafta dispute settle-
ment process. Resultantly, Mexico viewed the measures as falling within the scope of the 
gatt art xx(d) exception, which permits a wto Member to derogate from a gatt/wto 
obligation to secure compliance with laws or regulations. The panel concluded that the 
tax breached the wto NT obligation, but that the wto has no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
on obligations owed under nafta: Mexico – Soft Drinks, Panel Report [4.70], [4.72], 
[8.193], [8.199]. The panel’s conclusions were upheld on appeal by the Appellate Body. The 
Appellate Body disagreed with Mexico’s argument on gatt art xx(d), and stated that 
the term “laws or regulations” in gatt art xx(d) referred “to the rules that form part of the 
domestic legal order of the wto Member invoking the provision and do not include 
the international obligations of another wto Member”: Mexico – Soft Drinks, Appellate 
Body Report [75], [79]–[80]. See also detailed discussions in Sergio Puig, “The Merging of 
International Trade and Investment Law” (2015) 33(1) Berkeley Journal of International 
Law 1, 23–27; Roger Alford, “The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Ar-
bitration” (2014) 12(1) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 35, 46–47.
99 “Fork-in-the-road” clauses enable foreign investors to bypass the standard rule of public 
international law that requires parties to exhaust domestic remedies before lodging an 
international claim: see, eg, discussion in Deborah Ruff and Trevor Tan, “Fork-in-The-
Road Clauses: Divergent Paths in Recent Decisions”, Norton Rose Fulbright (Publication, 
October 2015) <http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/132586/
fork-in-the-road-clauses>; see also the discussion in Christoph Schreuer, “Calvo’s Grand-
children: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration” (2005) 4(1) The Law & 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1, 3–5; Christoph Schreuer, “Travelling the 
bit Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road” (2004) 5(2) Jour-
nal of World Investment and Trade 231, 239–249.
100 Puig, above n 89, 36; Schreuer, above n 90, 239–249; See further Norton Rose Fulbright, 
“Fork-in-the-Road clauses: Divergent Paths in Recent Decisions” (October 2015) <https://
www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0bd10ad8/fork-in-the-road-
clauses> (accessed 11 July 2019).
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enforcement alternatives, and do not concern treaty selection.101 Hence, the 
options for investors will be limited to local courts or redress under the opera-
tive fta or bit.
In the simulated scenarios discussed above, governmental actions were 
prompted by domestic compulsions in all three instances. If the act of impos-
ing export controls is deemed a sovereign act, local courts will then be required 
to extend constitutional cover to cover the measures. Foreign investors will un-
derstandably be reluctant to approach domestic courts for redress. In the first 
and third scenarios especially, the government of the host state can refuse to 
pay any compensation by arguing that measures restricting exports were sov-
ereign actions to alleviate “general or local short supply”. If the matter proceeds 
to arbitration, the government can take up the plea that its export controls 
were an act of state.102
As stated above, the wto dispute-settlement system can only be pursued as 
an alternative if there is a prima facie violation of gatt/wto norms in the 
imposition of export controls. On rare occasions, and if the investors have 
enough financial resources along with significant influence, the aggrieved in-
vestor can pursue parallel claims under isds and wto dispute settlement pro-
ceedings.103 Parallel proceedings may sometimes become necessary to secure 
comprehensive relief for the investors. For example, in the Mexico – Soft Drinks 
case, an action was pursued in the wto alongside isds proceedings under 
nafta. Alford notes that in the case of Mexico imposing unlawful taxes on soft 
drinks, the wto and nafta systems complemented each other in securing 
101 Puig (n 98) 36.
102 This was recently illustrated in Reliance Industries Ltd and BG Exploration & Production 
India Ltd v India, in which the claimants (Reliance Industries and BG Exploration) lodged 
an arbitration claim against the respondent government (India) for unpaid sums due on 
production sharing contracts. After the tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to deter-
mine the question of legality of the government ordering its subordinate departments to 
withhold payments, the matter was appealed to the Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial 
Court in England. Popplewell J held that the issues in question were covered under the 
foreign-act-of-state doctrine and were thus non-justiciable before the court and non-arbi-
trable before the tribunal. This decision underscores the application of act of state doc-
trine in arbitration as well as court proceedings. The implication of the decision is that a 
state party intending to avoid performance under a contract can easily issue executive 
orders, ordinances or legislation and then invoke the act-of-state principle in any pro-
ceedings where the seat of arbitration is in England: see generally Reliance Industries Ltd 
and BG Exploration & Production India Ltd v India [2018] ewhc 822 (Comm); see also 
Lucia Raimanova and Matej Kosalko, “Act of State Doctrine Applies in Arbitration”, Allen 
& Overy (Web Page, 21 June 2018) <http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/ 
|Pages/Act-of-State-doctrine-applies-in-arbitration.aspx>.
103 Puig (n 98) 44.
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both prospective and retroactive relief for the investors.104 If the wto had 
been the only system used to adjudicate the dispute, then the wto Appellate 
Body’s direction to Mexico, to repeal the unlawful taxes, would have been the 
end of the matter. However, parallel claims under arbitration enabled the ag-
grieved investors to collectively receive approximately USD170 million in dam-
ages in three separate claims.105
Another recent example concerns the action launched by Cuba, Indonesia, 
Ukraine, Honduras and Dominican Republic against the Australian tobacco 
plain-packaging legislation in the wto, alleging violation of the wto’s Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.106 This action was 
launched in parallel to isds proceedings instituted by Philip Morris under the 
Hong Kong–Australia bit.107 Sergio Puig terms this behaviour of mncs as “par-
ty shopping”, whereby private parties strategically select a state party to es-
pouse a claim on their behalf in the wto.108
104 Alford (n 98) 47.
105 Three claims cited by Alford (n 98) 47 are: (i) Archer Daniels Midland Co et al v Mexico 
(Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB(AF)/04/05, 21 November 2007), where 
the tribunal awarded USD33 million in damages to the Claimant; (ii) Corn Products Inter-
national Inc v Mexico (Decision on Responsibility) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No 
ARB(AF)/04/01, 15 January 2008), where the tribunal awarded USD58.4 million in dam-
ages; and (iii) Cargill Inc v Mexico (Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No 
ARB(AF)/05/02, 18 September 2009), where the tribunal awarded USD77.3 million in 
damages.
106 See generally Panel Report, Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geo-
graphical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Prod-
ucts and Packaging, wto Doc WT/DS435/R; WT/DS441/R; WT/DS458/R; WT/DS467/R 
(28 June 2018). In this case, the wto panel endorsed Australia’s plain packaging laws by 
holding that they contributed to improving public health by reducing and discouraging 
use of tobacco products: [7.228]–[7.232], [7.1725], [7.1731], [7.2794]–[7.2795]; see also 
“Australia Wins Landmark World Trade Organisation Ruling on Tobacco Plain Packaging 
Laws”, abc News (Web Page, 28 June 2018) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-29/ 
australia-wins-landmark-wto-ruling-on-tobacco-plain-packaging/9921972>.; Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 
1867 unts 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1C (“Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”) (“trips Agreement”).
107 See generally Philip Morris Asia Ltd v Australia (Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 
(Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2012-12, 17 December 2015); Agreement between 
the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong Kong for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, signed 15 September 1993, [1993] ats 30 (entered into force 15 Oc-
tober 1993).
108 Puig (n 98) 36; Alford observes that one of the complainants in the wto case (Ukraine) 
had not exported tobacco to Australia in recent years: Alford (n 98) 50. British American 
Tobacco was known to be assisting Ukraine with its legal costs in the wto claim because 
mncs currently have no standing to lodge a wto claim. Ukraine eventually dropped the 
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Parallel proceedings usually involve mncs with significant resources engag-
ing in a protracted dispute-resolution process. Pursuing such a strategy is 
based on a careful study of costs and benefits. In the simulated scenarios, all 
three affected businesses will have to determine whether they wish to pursue 
a strategy based on isds coupled with a wto claim. For the parallel action 
strategy to work, the mncs in question will have to lobby their governments to 
bring about a state-based response in the wto, which is a difficult proposition 
due to the largely self-regulating nature of wto dispute-settlement system.109
5.3 The Second Path: isds Adapting wto Dispute-Settlement 
Jurisprudence as an Interpretative Aid (Convergence)
Given the challenges of adopting the approach outlined above, investors may 
consider “borrowing” arguments from wto jurisprudence when pursuing their 
isds claim against the host state. China – Rare Earths and China – Raw Materi-
als have demonstrated that the wto remains interested in promoting the fair 
and equitable allocation of resources between domestic users and importers. 
However, the challenge in cross-implementing the wto standards in invest-
ment disputes is a grey area. If disputes on export controls remain within the 
realm of international trade, gatt/wto norms may provide a prospective so-
lution (ie, the wto dsb recommending that the offending wto member 
brings its impugned measures in line with its wto obligations). It is only when 
the export control disputes encroach into the field of international investment 
law that there are no clear characterisations of the issue, primarily because 
there are no international agreements addressing the relationship between ex-
port controls and expropriation. The meaning of expropriation has been left to 
individual bits and ftas and the interpretation of arbitral tribunals. Decisions 
issued in the past by the isds tribunals have done little to resolve the question 
of whether the host country remains the master of their natural resources or 
becomes subject to the requirement of an equitable distribution of resources 
after signing bits and/or ftas.
 claim against Australia, citing hopes of finding a mutually agreed solution with Australia: 
“Ukraine Drops Lawsuit against Australia over Plain-Packaging Tobacco Laws, wto Says”, 
abc News (Web Page, 3 June 2015) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-04/plain-pac 
kaging-tobacco-ukraine-drops-lawsuit-against-australia/6520160>.
109 Puig (n 98) 36–37, citing Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of 
High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the dsu by the 
United States, wto Doc WT/DS132/AB/RW (22 October 2001) [73]–[74], wherein the Ap-
pellate Body deemed that the request for establishment of panel by a wto Member is 
premised on good faith and an exercise of sound judgment regarding the utility of dispute 
settlement process under the wto system.
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Future arbitral panels confronted with the question of export controls and 
indirect expropriation may consider “importing” or “transplanting” the inter-
pretation of the concept of a local or general short supply of materials from 
gatt/wto norms.110 The interpretation of gatt art xx(j) by the Appellate 
Body in India – Solar Cells (especially in para [6.4]) may provide a useful initial 
point. The concluding comment in para [6.4], namely, “whether and which 
factors are relevant necessarily depend on the particularities of each case”, can 
be termed as a control valve for the application of the standard to determine 
whether an export control can be justified based on “local or general short sup-
ply” similar in spirit to the chapeau of gatt art xx. This is just a starting point. 
The remaining development of the concept will then, it is hoped, assume a 
more organic trajectory in the form of arbitral panel decisions and their im-
pacts on future bits and ftas. The adoption of gatt art xx(j) reasoning can 
further enable policymakers in host states to construct wto- and/or bit- 
compliant export controls in a manner that limits the possibility of challenges 
by foreign investors.
The approach of importing from wto jurisprudence has not only been con-
sidered by arbitral panels in the past, but has received growing academic atten-
tion in recent years, resulting in a “convergence” of international trade and in-
vestment law.111 This is not to suggest that the convergence approach finds total 
approval. It is merely a course of action which can be considered as an initial 
point in international investment dispute resolution where there are ambigui-
ties in law or an absence of jurisprudence on an issue.
110 The underlying assumption is that export controls were imposed for alleviating local 
shortages or for domestic price stabilisation. Puig terms this approach as “transplanta-
tion”, whereby disputing parties may import a rule from one trade treaty to another in-
vestment treaty. Puig cites the example of the strategy employed by Philip Morris, linking 
Australia’s obligations under the Hong Kong–Australia bit with Australia’s wto obliga-
tions under the trips Agreement and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 
1994, 1867 unts 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1A (“Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade”)): Puig (n 98) 41–44.
111 Jurgen Kurtz, “The Use and Abuse of wto Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition 
and its Discontents” (2009) 20(3) European Journal of International Law 749, 751–759, 770–
771; Robert Howse and Efraim Chalamish, “The Use and Abuse of wto Law in Investor-
State Arbitration: A Reply to Jurgen Kurtz” (2010) 20(4) European Journal of International 
Law 1087, 1088–1090; Alford (n 98) 37; Frank Garcia et al, “Reforming the International 
Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law” (2015) 18(4) Journal of Inter-
national Economic Law 861, 864; Brooks Allen and Tommaso Soave, “Jurisdictional Over-
lap in wto Dispute Settlement and Investment Arbitration” (2014) 30(1) Arbitration Inter-
national 1, 28; Andrea Bjorklund, “Convergence or Complementarity” (2013) 12(1) Santa 
Clara Journal of International Law 65, 68–70; Puig (n 98) 4–5.
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By way of illustration, isds proceedings on NT issues show that dispute-
settlement tribunals are hesitant to adopt wto jurisprudence to explain NT in 
an fta and/or bit context. For example, in Pope and Talbot v Canada, the re-
spondent (Canada) attempted to base its arguments on the NT standard under 
wto law and import the same understanding in its dispute regarding softwood 
lumber with a US-based investor under nafta.112 Canada specifically claimed 
that even where the foreign investor was awarded a lower quota than domestic 
producers, there was no discrimination because foreign investors were not dis-
advantaged disproportionately as a group.113 Kurtz observes that Canada’s ar-
guments imply that the impact of a measure must be determined by compar-
ing two basic groups (local producers and foreign investors) to assess any 
disproportionate impact on foreign investors as a whole.114 In its analysis, the 
tribunal rebutted Canada’s argument that the disproportionate disadvantage 
test was grounded in wto jurisprudence.115 The tribunal specifically pointed 
out that the disproportionate disadvantage test was unwieldly and posed prac-
tical obstacles in its implementations. In particular, the tribunal stated that if 
Canada’s arguments were adopted, this would mean that the foreign investor 
would have to undertake the mammoth task of tracking the quota details of 
US-owned companies in Canada and then consider the treatment being ac-
corded to those companies as a whole in contrast with domestic companies 
operating in like circumstances.116 The tribunal concluded that, were this the 
approach to be taken, “only in the simplest and most obvious cases of denial of 
national treatment could the complainant hope to make a case for recovery”.117 
Based on Pope and Talbot v Canada alone, and contrasting the three alternative 
scenarios provided in this article, a foreign corporation could consider making 
parallel arguments based on wto laws, alongside an isds claim, that export 
controls by host states are discriminatory and amount to indirect expropria-
tion, if it can be demonstrated that local actors are being advantaged.
Note, however, that this strategy may encounter practical difficulties for the 
aggrieved investors. The example being discussed here shows the potential 
possibilities, but not necessarily a practical strategy. Other disputes where the 
convergence approach was considered encountered cautious responses by the 
relevant dispute settlement tribunals. For example, in another nafta dispute, 
112 See Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada (Award on the Merits of Phase 2) (Ad Hoc Tribunal under 
the uncitral Arbitration Rules, 10 April 2001) [43]–[44] (“Pope & Talbot v Canada”).
113 Kurtz (n 111) 761.
114 Pope & Talbot v Canada (n 112) [46]–[63].
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid [71]–[72]; Kurtz (n 111) 762.
117 Pope & Talbot v Canada (n 112) [71]–[72]; Kurtz (n 111) 762.
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SD Myers v Canada, the tribunal cited the Appellate Body’s treatment of “like” 
circumstances in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, wherein the Appellate 
Body had commented that:118
[T]here can be no one precise and absolute definition of what is “like”. 
The concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an ac-
cordion. The accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in different 
places as different provisions of the wto Agreement are applied.
The tribunal observed that similar to the gatt treatment of “like”, the overall 
legal context provided by the fta (in this case nafta) and any other treaties 
must be considered carefully.119 The tribunal pointed out that all three nafta 
countries are also part of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (“oecd”) and hence, the oecd Declaration on International and 
Multinational Enterprises becomes relevant as well in determining the ques-
tion of “like” circumstances.120
In the well-known Methanex dispute, the tribunal considered the wto 
concept of NT in order to determine the connection between “like cir-
cumstances” and “like products”.121 The tribunal in Methanex specifically 
observed that “if the drafters of nafta had wanted to incorporate trade 
criteria in its investment chapter by engrafting a GATT-type formula, 
they could have produced a version of Article 1102”.122
118 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, wto Doc WT/DS8/AB/R; 
WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R (4 October 1996) 21 (“Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, Ap-
pellate Body Report”), cited in SD Myers v Canada (Partial Award) (North American Free 
Trade Agreement Tribunal under the uncitral Arbitration Rules, 13 November 2000) 
[244] (“SD Myers v Canada”).
119 SD Myers v Canada (n 118) [245], [248].
120 The oecd Declaration on International and Multinational Enterprises dealt with the “like 
situation” test by affirming that
 [T]he comparison between foreign-controlled enterprises is only valid if it is made be-
tween firms operating in the same sector. More general considerations, such as the policy 
objectives of Member countries could be considered to define the circumstances in 
which comparison between foreign-controlled and domestic enterprises is permissible 
inasmuch as those objectives are not contrary to the principle of national treatment …
 Ibid [249], citing the 1993 version of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, oecd Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 21 
June 1976.
121 Kurtz (n 111) 763–765; Methanex (Final Award) (n 71) 1447–1448.
122 Methanex (Final Award) (n 71) 1447–1448.
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More specifically, the tribunal noted that it was apparent from the text that 
the drafters of nafta were careful about the inclusion of the terms such as 
“like goods”, “any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods” and “like 
circumstances”.123 The tribunal observed that “like goods” is not used within 
the context of Ch 11 (investment), while “like circumstances” (which is used as 
an expression in art 1102, within Ch 11) is used for investment, with respect to 
standards related to measures constituting technical barriers to trade (“tbts”), 
only in relation to services but not in relation to goods.124
Roger Alford comments that regardless of whether the tribunals in Pope and 
Talbot, SD Myers and Methanex reached the correct result, these leading cases 
presumed the relevance of wto jurisprudence and that comments that the 
“pull toward reliance on wto as persuasive authority appears almost irresisti-
ble”.125 Alford also cites comments by a dissenting arbitrator in ups v Canada, 
who argued that the wording of nafta art 1102 suggests a close connection to 
NT standards in gatt and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“gats”), 
as well as other international trade and investment treaties.126 The dissenting 
arbitrator views this as a reading consistent with precedent under gatt and 
wto.127
It is noticeable that the nafta cases discussed above are based on the is-
sue of NT between domestic industries and foreign investor-owned businesses 
aggrieved by governmental measures. The simulated scenarios in this article 
differ significantly, in that they deal with export controls which curtail foreign 
investors’ ability to export. The scenarios have assumed that the export con-
trols due to “local and general short supply” have equally affected the local 
industries, hence, a breach of NT can be set aside as a non-issue. Since export 
controls are not mentioned in any fta or bit specifically, in the absence of 
any express provisions, the standard discussed by the Appellate Body in India – 
Solar Cells can be considered as a close guide as to how they will be treated by 
an international investment tribunal.
The convergence approach, however, brings its own complications. Ac-
cording to some commentators, the approach of borrowing gatt/wto 
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Alford (n 98) 42.
126 Alford (n 98) 42 n 27, citing comments by Dean Ronald Cass in United Parcel Service 
of America Inc v Canada (Award on the Merits) (Separate Statement of Dean Ronald 
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 jurisprudence requires sophisticated analysis by qualified individuals in the 
area, in order to minimise any inconsistencies in awards.128 Kurtz opines 
that “serious, real-world implications” result from the cross-application of 
gatt/wto jurisprudence in investment disputes without a proper under-
standing of the underlying norms. He cites Argentina’s liability of millions of 
dollars due to “objective evidence of legal error” on the part of tribunals, which 
eventually resulted in the Latin American backlash to the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes system.129
The attempt to connect wto law with international investment disputes 
has received some criticism as well. In the context of the US–Argentina bit 
and the claims for compensation by investors thereunder, the practice of draw-
ing from wto jurisprudence carries the merit of applying an internationally 
used standard which may be preferable to the prospect of applying domestic 
law of the host state to the dispute.130 However, there were no reasons to as-
sume that drafters of the US–Argentina bit intended to connect modern wto 
law to bit disputes.131 This is mainly because the meaning of “necessary” in 
128 Kurtz cites the instance of the presiding arbitrator in Continental Casualty Company v 
Argentina who had served on the wto Appellate Body: Kurtz (n 111) 771, citing Continental 
Casualty Company v Argentina (Award) (icsid Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/03/9, 5 
September 2008), 85–89, [193]–[199]; see also Puig (n 98) 29; Alec Stone Sweet, “Investor-
State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier” (2014) 4(1) Law & Ethics of Human 
Rights 48, 49, 69–75 (Sweet terms the analysis by the tribunal in Continental Casualty as a 
“rich piece of jurisprudence, far more sophisticated than the awards produced in … previ-
ous cases”). In Continental Casualty, Argentina defended its regulatory measures as neces-
sary and relied upon the comparative definition of the term “necessary” under gatt art 
xx for explaining the effect of art xi in the Treaty between United States of America and the 
Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
signed 14 November 1991 (entered into force 20 October 1994). The arbitral panel applied 
the wto jurisprudence regarding gatt art xx from previous cases such as  Korea – Beef 
and Brazil – Retreaded Tyres in explaining the terms “necessary” and “necessity”.
129 For example, the leading economy in Latin America (Brazil) has refused to ratify the Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, opened for signature 18 March 1965, 575 unts 159 (entered into force 14 October 
1966) (“icsid Convention”). Other resource-rich developing economies in Latin America 
such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela withdrew from the icsid Convention and Argen-
tina threatened to withdraw (but has not withdrawn) from the icsid Convention: see also 
Kurtz (n 111) 771; Jurgen Kurtz, “Adjudging the Exceptional at International Law: Security, 
Public Order and Financial Crisis” (Working Paper 06/08, Jean Monnet Program, 2008) 
25–29.
130 See the discussion in José E Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, “The Argentine Arisis and For-
eign Investors: a Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime” (Working Paper 
2008/5, Institute for International Law and Justice, 2008) 54–55.
131 Ibid.
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gatt art xx is linked to a balancing test, implied in the preamble of that provi-
sion, which is missing from art xi of the US–Argentina bit.132 The thrust of 
this criticism seems to be that importing gatt/wto norms into a bit dispute 
is not merited, because the underlying treaty framework is affected by how 
operative clauses are interpreted in light of its substantive content.
6 Final Thoughts
Regardless of the two paths taken in resolving investment disputes on export 
controls, the field remains open to different interpretations and independent 
variables that may affect the outcome of disputes in the future. Multiple per-
spectives can determine the validity of export controls, which can affect the 
legality of the measures challenged in an isds setting. For host states, the ques-
tion of imposing export controls must be looked at by policymakers through 
the lens of legitimacy and necessity. The experience of gatt/wto jurispru-
dence and various arbitral awards is particularly illustrative for policymakers 
in constructing measures that remain within the gatt/wto framework, while 
also remaining true to any applicable norms set by bilateral ftas and/or bits. 
It is fully possible that the resolution of points of contention in investment 
disputes may involve adjudication through transplanted norms from the 
gatt/wto system. Additional complications can also stem from the selective 
citation of arbitral awards in previous investment disputes. The task of con-
structing legitimate and justifiable export control measures is, therefore, a dif-
ficult one for host states.
Conversely, the foreign investors can approach the process of challenging 
export controls from both a trade and investment angle. The obvious proviso 
is that foreign investors must possesses enough resources along with influence 
to trigger a state-based espousal on their behalf in the wto. Investment ar-
bitration can never be assumed to be fully self-contained system, even when 
modern ftas and bits are becoming increasingly prescriptive. isds panels 
cannot ignore the general norms and rules of international law in the arbi-
tral process.133 Additionally, the arbitral process suffers from a lack of any 
precedent-creating systems which could assure consistency for users of the 
132 Ibid 55.
133 Margie-Lys Jaime, “Relying Upon Parties” Interpretation in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: Filling the Gaps in International Investment Agreements’ (2014) 
46(1) Georgetown Journal of International Law 261, 272–277.
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system.134 With state-based espousal in the wto a difficult proposition, the 
aggrieved foreign investor may wish to consider importing parallel arguments 
from the realm of international trade to reinforce their claims. For policymak-
ers in host states, this means that design of export controls must be such that 
it remains compatible with trade and investment obligations.
134 Ibid 277–278; see generally the discussion in Alain Pellet, “Annulment Faute de Mieux: Is 
there a Need for an Appeals Facility?” in N Jansen Calamita, David Earnest and Markus 
Burgstaller (eds), The Future of icsibid and the Place of Investment Treaties in Interna-
tional Law: Current Issues in Investment Treaty Law (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2013) bk 4 255.
0004664868.INDD   117 12/24/2019   7:26:22 PM
